Building Inclusive Communities:

Learning from Programs and Policies that Work

United Way Greater Toronto

BGM Strategy Group

LAND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

It is with profound respect that United Way Greater Toronto acknowledges that we operate on the traditional territory and gathering place of many Indigenous nations including the Wendat, the Anishnaabeg and the Haudenosaune. Today, it is home to many urban Indigenous peoples, including Inuit, Métis and First Nations peoples.

We recognize that the Greater Toronto Area is covered by several treaties including Treaty 13 signed with the Mississaugas of the Credit First Nation and the Williams Treaties signed by seven First Nations including the Chippewas of Beausoleil, Georgina Island and Rama, and the Mississaugas of Alderville, Curve Lake, Hiawatha and Scugog Island.

We recognize the rights of Indigenous communities and acknowledge the ancestral and unceded territories of the Inuit, Métis, and First Nations peoples across Turtle Island. We honour the teachings of Indigenous peoples with respect to the land we each call home and our responsibilities to the land and one another. We are committed to improving our relations with Indigenous peoples and acting on our responsibilities in Truth and Reconciliation and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.

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United Way Greater Toronto

WORKING WITH COMMUNITIES IN PEEL, TORONTO & YORK REGION

As the largest non-government funder of community services in the GTA, United Way Greater Toronto reinforces a crucial community safety net to support people living in poverty. United Way's network of agencies and initiatives in neighbourhoods across Peel, Toronto and York Region works to ensure that everyone has access to the programs and services they need to thrive. Mobilizing community support, United Way's work is rooted in groundbreaking research, strategic leadership, local advocacy and cross-sectoral partnerships committed to building a more equitable region and lasting solutions to the GTA's greatest challenges.

unitedwaygt.org

BGM Strategy Group

BGM Strategy Group specializes in qualitative and quantitative research and multi-stakeholder strategy. BGM undertakes and coordinates qualitative research with experts and stakeholders while drawing on deep knowledge of the public policy process and the sectors involved. Projects span across sectors, from housing and homelessness to health and local inclusive economic development.

BGM brings a strong familiarity with and understanding of the Greater Toronto Area. While projects span across sectors, BGM works extensively with agencies in the community and voluntary sector. Much of this work requires a thorough and up-to-date understanding of government priorities and investments affecting vulnerable residents in the Greater Toronto region.

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Foreword

Look around. Everywhere, there are signs the GTA is growing. Ambitious immigration targets and recent projections show Ontario's population is on track to increase by 6 million in 20 years. We know there's no slowing down. We know, too, that what helps us address labour shortages and ensure economic growth also brings added pressures: to transportation and housing systems, to government and social services—and to the very neighbourhoods in which we live.

Neighbourhoods are what we at United Way Greater Toronto know best. It's where we direct our efforts supporting people through the challenges they face daily, mobilizing a network of local agencies to provide the programs and services people need most. It is where we've focused our research, built our reputation for constructive partnerships and are piloting progressive models for employment, housing and local prosperity—in every sense. And ultimately, it's in neighbourhoods that everything we do to drive systems change and transform our region for a more equitable and inclusive future is felt most deeply.

With the *More Homes Built Faster Act*, 2022 signalling more to come, we're working with others not just to accommodate growth, but to leverage it for investments that will protect and strengthen communities, both those navigating neighbourhood change today, and those yet to be.

Existing or new, neighbourhoods should be inclusive, strong and vibrant. Places where people have equitable access to services and amenities; opportunities for civic engagement; and the means to financial empowerment and stable housing. Communities where people, quite simply, have the opportunity to build a better life.

The nine program and policy interventions identified in this report can help us get there. We've selected them because of their proven track record and potential to preserve and promote greater social and economic inclusion and generate positive social change. And we've unpacked what makes them successful, so that we can put them into action. Now.

They offer us the best way forward. The rest is up to us. From the details of what combinations, timing and scale to a generous spirit of collaboration and commitment. Together, we can deliver the kinds of communities—and collective future—we all deserve.

Out of great change can come opportunity. Let's seize it.



Daniele Zanotti
President & CEO
United Way Greater Toronto

INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES

As a working definition, United Way understands inclusive communities as welcoming places that meet the changing needs of a diversity of residents, regardless of background and financial circumstances, throughout the life cycle. Inclusive communities provide equitable access to the resources, programs and services, and opportunities residents need to participate fully in society and actualize individual and collective prosperity and well-being.

Introduction

Neighbourhoods change over time due to several intersecting and complex drivers including shifts in population, demographics, social norms and economic conditions. These changes can revitalize communities, bringing new amenities, services and opportunities to residents and businesses, and enhancing sense of community and local pride in place. They can also have negative effects, such as diminished affordability and the displacement of residents, small businesses and community-based organizations.

Today, the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) is developing, redeveloping and revitalizing at an unprecedented rate.[1] Across the region, revitalization projects are making manifest the contemporary urban paradox: good design, planning and public infrastructure investments lead to exclusive growth and growing unaffordability, facilitating gentrification by forcing out existing lower-income residents and/or blocking opportunities for new lower-income residents to settle in the area. Yet, revitalization and unequal development are not synonymous.[2] When equity principles are layered into planning, local growth and development can spur positive neighbourhood change by both addressing existing inequities and preventing creation of new inequities.[3] And this is critical given that greater equity leads to stronger long-term growth and economic well-being.[4]

This report offers a partial and promising roadmap toward development of more inclusive communities by exploring and identifying a mix of targeted place-based program interventions and broader policy interventions that can be implemented to limit the negative impacts of neighbourhood change on GTA residents and communities. Upon reviewing the evidence, it is clear these program and policy interventions must be used together to create more inclusive communities.

For decades, United Way Greater Toronto (United Way) has been at the forefront of building inclusive communities across the region. With insights from our *Poverty by Postal Code* report, released in 2004, we recognized the geographic nature of neighbourhood poverty and acted by aligning our investment strategy to support neighbourhoods defined by high concentrations of poverty. Based on further evidence-based research—our own and that of others—United Way has worked with communities to test several tools and approaches to drive more inclusive outcomes during neighbourhood renewal initiatives.[5] This work includes interventions for revitalizing tower communities through the Tower Neighbourhood Renewal Initiative, social impact investments focused on fostering community cohesion between new and long-time residents in Toronto's Regent Park neighbourhood, and the Inclusive Local Economic Opportunity (ILEO)

Initiative. Through ILEO, United Way is working in collaboration with public and private sector leaders, community agencies and local residents to pilot innovative ways to drive inclusive economic opportunity within a changing Greater Golden Mile neighbourhood. Billions of dollars in public and private investments are transforming the Golden Mile from a mix of big box stores and large parking lots, surrounded mostly by walk-up apartments and single-family homes, into one of the largest residential and commercial communities in east Toronto. This transformation will have ripple effects on the surrounding neighbourhoods. Through ILEO, United Way and partners are working to address the risk of displacement and ensure the economic gains resulting from the transformation of the Greater Golden Mile will flow to new and existing low- and moderate-income residents.

These and other place-based programs focused on neighbourhood level change have provided fertile grounds for innovation driven by and for local communities. Initiatives iterate over time using local community-based knowledge and grassroots initiatives and are strongest when paired with formal program and public policy development. In other words, when bottom-up program design meets top-down policy levers, symbiotic interventions can work together for positive social change.

This report is an evidence-gathering exercise focused on building the body of knowledge around interventions that support development of more socially and economically inclusive communities. We are seeking a greater understanding of programs and policy interventions that deepen and sustain equitable outcomes for all residents—existing and new—in revitalizing residential areas. In studying the types of interventions successfully implemented, and the concept of "success" itself, this report examines demonstrated methods to preserving and promoting greater social and economic inclusion for neighbourhoods undergoing change. The interventions presented here provide guidance on how to plan for stronger, more equitable, more inclusive communities, now and for future generations.

Inclusive Communities

Defining Inclusive Communities

Reconciliation and equity are at the heart of inclusive communities and a grounding principle for United Way's work. Wealth disparities are concentrated spatially at the neighbourhood level across the GTA. There are clear connections between postal code and inequitable life and health outcomes for residents, particularly affecting Indigenous, racialized and other structurally disadvantaged groups long impacted by discriminatory policies and practices. Prioritizing equitable city planning as a collective goal and ambition can help us realize a more just and inclusive region.[6] This is critical from both an ethical perspective, where we value the inherent dignity of all, as well as a financial one, where equity is understood as complementary to enhanced economic performance.[7]

As a working definition, United Way understands inclusive communities as welcoming places that meet the changing needs of a diversity of residents, regardless of background and financial circumstances, throughout the life cycle. Inclusive communities provide equitable access to the resources, programs and services, and opportunities residents need to participate fully in society and actualize individual and collective prosperity and well-being. Inclusive communities have at least four interrelated pillars:

4 Pillars

STRONG SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE:

Residents have access to myriad goods, services and amenities including accessible commerce, education, healthcare services, community services and supports, public meeting spaces and community hubs, recreation and green spaces, and arts and cultural spaces reflective of a community's distinct and multi-layered cultural geographies and identities. Social service and community agencies play a critical role, supporting residents to respond to community challenges.

RESIDENT ENGAGEMENT, LEADERSHIP AND BELONGING:

Residents participate actively in civic life to influence decisions and shape the future of their communities, whether through volunteerism, voting, participation in social or political groups and/or social justice activism and advocacy, among other activities. Residents have strong social network connections and high levels of trust in neighbours and institutions (i.e., social capital) and contribute to development of new counter-narratives that offer divergent perspectives on an issue.

FINANCIAL EMPOWERMENT AND STABILITY:

Residents have access to employment opportunities through education, training and good jobs that provide on-ramps to individual and community wealth-building. For those unable to work, social assistance offers liveable levels of income support with dignity and pathways to independence.

STRONG AND ACCESSIBLE PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE:

Residents have access to reliable and affordable transportation and stable, adequate and affordable housing options across the housing continuum, including non-market and market rental and homeownership options as well as non-traditional community equity and shared ownership models.

Not all aspects of each pillar need to be physically located within a community for it to be inclusive. For example, residents need access to quality education (social infrastructure) and employment (financial empowerment), but these need not necessarily be situated within their neighbourhoods, provided accessible transportation (physical infrastructure) facilitates timely travel to employment or educational opportunities. As neighbourhoods change, neighbourhood-based interventions focused on maintaining and enhancing access to affordable housing and employment, training and educational opportunities within the neighbourhood become essential.

This report focuses on program and policy interventions that directly address two of the four pillars of inclusive communities: financial empowerment and stability, and strong and accessible physical infrastructure, with an emphasis on housing-related initiatives. Economic opportunities and housing are vital in raising the standard of living for all, by providing residents with a means to support themselves and a place to live, creating a foundation from which they can strengthen and achieve their social objectives (i.e., resident engagement, leadership and belonging and strong social infrastructure).[8]


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often sheltered in
Regent Park
A home to

PROGRAM INTERVENTIONS:

- Workforce agreements
- Neighbourhood-level workforce development programs
- Community land trusts

POLICY INTERVENTIONS:

- Rent control
- Inclusionary zoning
- Linkage fees
- Social procurement
- Rental unit replacement
- Right to return requirements

Nine Types of Interventions for More Inclusive Neighbourhood Change

Communities are ecosystems that rely on healthy interactions between and among diverse actors and policies to flourish. Fostering inclusive communities requires commitment and collaboration across diverse stakeholders—governments, residents, anchor institutions, community sector organizations and private sector enterprises—with each influencing impact at the neighbourhood level at different scales. Neighbourhood-level programs amplify public policies and vice versa.

The nine interventions identified in this report fall into two categories: program interventions and policy interventions.

Programs are localized, and typically—though not exclusively—implemented by non-government actors. They can be enabled, instigated and amplified by government policy. In some cases, a program could be brought to scale and universalized through government legislation, crossing over into the realm of policy.

What we have labelled policy interventions are government initiated and relate to the "rules of the game" governing how neighbourhoods can change and develop. Other factors including tax policy, zoning and land use regulations, public investments and public services play a role as well. Virtually every government policy has an influence on inclusive communities. Apart from **social procurement**, which aims to provide economic opportunities to systemically disadvantaged groups of residents, the policy interventions included here pertain to housing affordability. One of the most common features of exclusionary neighbourhood

Benefits

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

Community benefits agreements (CBAs) are project-specific contracts negotiated between communities and private or public developers. CBAs maximize social, cultural, environmental, and economic opportunities of infrastructure or development projects for the existing community by providing physical infrastructure, social infrastructure, workforce development opportunities and/or other agreed upon benefits to local residents.

change is the eviction or exclusion of low-income residents. The policies included here focus on affordable housing production and preservation as enablers to keeping existing low-to moderate-income residents in community and creating welcoming spaces for new low-to moderate-income residents to join the community and benefit from neighbourhood revitalization efforts.[9]

The role of Community Benefits Agreements

Community Benefits Agreements (CBAs) are not included as a stand-alone intervention in this report, despite being valuable tools for promoting inclusive communities as neighbourhoods experience change. They are noted instead as a tool to strengthen several of the interventions outlined in the report, where the intervention could be built into a CBA.

CBAs are extremely flexible, reflecting the priorities of the parties involved and the local policy context that enables them. This flexibility is at the root of their success, enabling the various parties to engage on mutual goals and maximize the unique opportunities presented by specific development/redevelopment projects.

Program Interventions

1 Workforce Agreements

WHO'S INVOLVED:

- Regional and municipal governments
- Builders and developers
- Anchor institutions and businesses
- Community-based non-profits

Workforce agreements create robust workforce and hiring policies for development (contractors/subcontractors and ongoing employment) using public land or direct investment. Workforce agreements enable municipalities to leverage their public works and community development resources to increase access to employment opportunities for local residents vulnerable to neighbourhood change. Similar to **neighbourhood-level workforce development programs**, workforce agreements offer opportunities to residents vulnerable to job loss as a result of changing local economies, including closing or displaced businesses. This enables residents to learn new skills through training while staying economically linked to their neighbourhood during times of change.

First implemented by the City of Portland, Oregon, in 1978, "First Source Hiring" policies spread quickly before falling out of favour in the 1990s. In recent years, local hiring agreements have re-emerged as cities have begun to use CBAs to target the benefits of local economic development to systemically disadvantaged communities and populations.[10]

Today's workforce agreements come in different forms and with differing measures of success. Generally measured in terms of the percentage of local residents hired for specific development projects, evidence of whether workforce agreements produce stable, quality employment is mixed and is dependent on the design of the specific agreement.

In California, the City of East Palo Alto's First Source policy covers development contracts over $50,000 that receive a subsidy in the form of direct or indirect assistance from the City. The policy requires that 30 per cent of total hours worked on a subsidized construction project be worked by local residents.[11] Business tenants in city-funded projects must also comply to the 30 per cent local hiring target for permanent post-construction employment.[12] The City's redevelopment agency administers the program and is responsible for monitoring compliance. Violations of the First Source policy may lead to fines, withholding of funds and/or suspension or revocation of construction or occupancy permits.[13]

In recent years, local hiring agreements have re-emerged as cities have begun to use CBAs to target the benefits of local economic development to systemically disadvantaged communities and populations.

Between 2000 and 2007, only 23 per cent of construction jobs had gone to local residents. However, East Palo Alto was more successful in fulfilling its resident hiring goals on post-construction jobs, with 43 per cent of retail and service jobs in subsidized developments awarded to local residents over the same period.[14]

In 2005, the City of Toronto initiated a neighbourhood revitalization plan intended to bring a mix of housing and income types into the then exclusively social housing neighbourhood of Regent Park. As part of the CBA between the social housing agency (Toronto Community Housing Corporation, TCHC) and the private developer (the Daniels Corporation, Daniels), and informed by intensive community consultation, a workforce agreement was included giving local residents job priority for construction and post-construction opportunities within the neighbourhood. The CBA provided employment training and apprenticeships funded by Daniels, TCHC, the City of Toronto, a local arts and technology college (George Brown College) and a trades organization (Carpenters District Council of Ontario). Implementation was aided by engagement of local service organizations: United Way anchor agency Dixon Hall's community economic development and youth programs were instrumental in recruiting and preparing residents for trades opportunities. Daniels made local hiring part of their lease agreement with retail tenants, aiming to achieve a 10 per cent local hiring target for full-time positions.[15]

A 2016 report studying the Regent Park CBA concludes that several long-term jobs have been created as a result of its implementation in the bank, grocery store and other businesses that have since opened in the neighbourhood.[16] Further, a 2021 progress report indicates 1,690 jobs were filled by local residents since redevelopment began in 2006 as the combined result of the CBA and ongoing City-led workforce development programs in the neighbourhood.[17] That said, identified gaps in early stage data collection demonstrate a need for more robust research and evaluation to generate local evidence.[18]

Starting in 2015, the 11th St. Bridge Park redevelopment in Washington, DC featured a workforce agreement between the local government, not-for-profit park manager (Building Bridges Across the River) and a community developer (LISC-DC). The agreement was intitially focused on ensuring DC residents with low income had access to construction jobs related to the park itself.[19] When the economic development plan was revised in

2018, additional strategies broadened the scope of workforce activities to include post-construction jobs with a focus on long-term employment and programming to build the talent base and earning capacity of local artists. Involvement of the Skyland Workforce Center, a neighbourhood center representing a collective of six non-profits that deliver employment programs and services in the area, has been key to the success of the agreement. The Center serves as an anchor partner for training residents as contractors for the park's construction, connecting them to existing positions and working with the DC Department of Transportation to get residents hired.

Data from 2018-19 demonstrates substantive impact connected to the 11th St. Bridge Park redevelopment workforce agreement, particularly around quality of employment: Bridge Park residents employed through the agreement made on average $21.30 per hour in 2018-19, versus the $14 minimum wage at the time.[20]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make workforce agreements more effective:

- engagement of the community sector, which has expertise and capacity to engage community members in the implementation of workforce agreements;
- employer commitments to meet established living wage standards for participants;
- employment opportunities for participants beyond the scope of the project named in the workforce agreement;
- incentives, whether positive (rewards) or negative (penalties), allowing for proper enforcement of agreements;
- mechanisms to ensure timely and accurate reporting and evaluation, including conditioning progress payments on submission of complete payroll reports and the use of mandatory sanctions for failure to submit reports or for submitting falsified data;[21] and
- carefully defined eligibility criteria targeting neighbourhood residents and systemically disadvantaged workers living in or at risk of falling into poverty.

Connections to other interventions

1 2 **3** 4 **5** **6** **7** **8** 9

Community land trusts, inclusionary zoning, linkage fees and **rental unit replacement** all provide opportunities for cities and communities to negotiate with developers for employment opportunities. There are also opportunities to connect workforce agreements to municipal procurement policies. Requiring **social procurement** for new development and redevelopment projects has potential to incent development of workforce agreements and help grow community capacity to employ local residents and enhance individual and community-level employment and social outcomes.

Program Interventions

2

Neighbourhood-level Workforce Development Programs

WHO'S INVOLVED:

- Regional and municipal governments
- Builders
- Anchor institutions and businesses
- Community-based non-profits

Neighbourhood-level workforce development programs create training and supports tailored to the needs of a specific population, with on-ramps to available careers in the neighbourhood. These programs often involve partnership between community, education/training institutions, and employers, and because they are locally grounded, can effectively connect residents to the benefits of neighbourhood change.

Despite their local scale, neighbourhood-level workforce development programs can be initiated or supported through government policy or funding. The Government of Canada recently released funding under the Community Workforce Development Program for non-profits, for-profits, municipal governments, Indigenous organizations and educational institutions to do community workforce planning and development.[22] Similarly, the City of Toronto's Community Benefits Framework includes a workforce development component, which applies to specific projects.[23]

Typically, neighbourhood-level workforce development programs support resident skill-building and training focused on specific job streams, with the goal of connecting residents to employment opportunities. They often address mismatches between employment opportunities available in a neighbourhood and the actual or perceived employment profile of residents, whether local labour market shifts arise because of local redevelopment and emerging gentrification of neighbourhoods or due to larger macroeconomic trends like de-industrialization.[24]

Success of neighbourhood-level workforce development programs is generally measured based on the number of credentials and jobs obtained by participants or the employment rate of program participants.

For example, Project QUEST, founded by two community organizing groups in San Antonio, Texas after the widespread loss of local industrial jobs in the area, provides support and resources for low-income residents, primarily Latinx and Black women, to enroll in occupational training programs at local community colleges, complete the training, pass certification exams and enter well-paying careers in high-growth sectors of the local economy.[25]

Program evaluation finds Project QUEST has not only had a positive effect on the rate of employment but has also contributed to increased year-by-year average earnings for participants.[26] Average earnings gained by Project

Program evaluation finds Project QUEST has not only had a positive effect on the rate of employment but has also contributed to increased year-by-year average earnings for participants.

QUEST participants have been found to exceed the average cost of Project QUEST program services plus the average cost of participants' additional college enrollment by $17,416 over the 11-year follow-up period of one study.[27] Project QUEST was also found to make it more likely that participants will earn a college credential.[28] Strong social networks among program participants is cited as a critical success factor for this program.[29]

Other success metrics include the number of participants engaged in programs and the likelihood of redirecting their job search to the targeted growth industry. The Career Start Guarantee program was successfully implemented in South Rotterdam, a neighbourhood in the second largest city in the Netherlands, where three quarters of residents are first or second generation immigrants, and where residents also have high rates of unemployment, child poverty and low rates of formal education. The City of Rotterdam teamed up with employers for the implementation of the Career Start Guarantee program, part of a larger program called BRIDGE (Building the Right Investments for Delivering a Growing Economy) aiming to better align young people's educational choices with future labour market needs. Employers engaged in Career Start Guarantee offer 600 students per year (420 for technology sectors and 180 for health care) employment as they enter secondary vocational education. So long as students choose the training the labour market needs, employers will commit to hiring them upon graduation. A job guarantee demonstrates the value of the program to participants while recognizing systemic barriers. Impact investment instruments, such as public subsidy-based impact investing, social return on investment and social impact bonds support scaling of the program.[30]

According to its evaluation, Rotterdam's Career Start Guarantee program registration has increased yearly, from 272 in 2017-18 to 727 in 2020-21. In addition, the program led to shifts in career choice amongst its target population: In 2011-12, 32.6 per cent of South Rotterdam youth considered entering technical and health sectors, compared to 46 per cent in 2019-20 (greater than the average rate in several other Dutch cities).[31]

Another more recent and promising local example is Aecon-Golden Mile (A-GM), a community-led joint venture between Aecon Group Inc. and the not-for-profit Centre for Inclusive Economic Opportunity, Golden Mile (CIEO), founded in 2020 by 10 community agencies to create economic opportunities in the Greater Golden Mile. Part of United Way's ILEO initiative, the A-GM expands training and employment pathways into construction for local residents, with 51 per cent of profits reinvested in the community through the CIEO.[32] The program has hired eight people to date as part of utilities contracts, with ongoing recruitment for training and paid placements. A-GM is targeting 45 hires by December 2023 and eventually aims to achieve 100 per cent local operations.[33]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make neighbourhood-level workforce development programs more effective:

- comprehensive wraparound supports such as social services and vocational training;
- strong social networks and supports among the target population;
- job and decent wage guarantees;
- engagement and leadership of organizations with deep knowledge of community challenges and opportunities;
- partnerships with anchor institutions such as universities and hospitals that can contribute resources and expertise to support implementation;[34]
- engagement of municipal governments, which can bring legitimacy and resources to initiatives; and
- alignment on mutually agreed program and policy objectives among diverse cross-sector stakeholders in the neighbourhood.[35]

Connections to other interventions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Neighbourhood-level workforce development programs may comprise one element of wraparound services included in **workforce agreements** necessary to enable community members to take advantage of the employment opportunities agreed to under the agreement. Workforce development programs and policies could also be strengthened by including **social procurement** requirements in RFPs. Workforce development programs can also be considered in community benefits negotiations between developers and community groups.

Program Interventions

3

Community Land Trusts

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Community-based non-profits

Community-based housing providers

Community Land Trusts (CLTs) are non-profit entities that purchase and hold land for affordable home ownership, affordable rental and cooperative housing projects.[36] CLTs operate under the vision that land is a public asset, not private good, and that housing is a human right. They aim to protect long-term affordability by removing homes from the speculative market and creating greater housing stability, while building community assets.[37]

The North American model, established in Georgia in 1968 to prevent Black farmers from losing their land, was inspired by similar models of community owned land in Mexico, England and India. Most CLTs in the North American context have traditionally focused on homeownership, tending to benefit moderate-income households who can qualify for a mortgage.[38] To provide long-term affordable housing opportunities to the lowest income households, CLTs are increasingly adding rental units to their portfolios.[39]

Success of CLTs tends to be reported in terms of the number of units purchased by individual CLTs. Evidence of CLTs' ability to mitigate displacement is inconsistent. While there is evidence CLTs are effective at preventing displacement due to foreclosures, typically impacting low-to-moderate income homeowners, their impact on the lowest income groups is less clear given fewer and only more recent trends toward CLT rental units.[40] Despite a dearth of evidence indicating effectiveness at preventing displacement, owing to the literature's focus on homeownership, the most promising features of CLT models support affordable rental housing with potential to increase housing stability and decrease displacement within changing neighbourhoods.

Dudley Street (Boston) and Cooper Square (NYC) are two long-standing CLTs that have more recently moved beyond homeownership to diversify their portfolios. Dudley Street CLT was initiated in the 1980s through community mobilization fighting rapid gentrification in the Dudley Triangle neighbourhood.[41] The Dudley Street CLT was able to reach agreements with the City of Boston to take over underused, undervalued land in the neighbourhood and remove it from the speculative market.[42] There are currently 32 acres of land in the trust and the Dudley Street Neighbourhood

The most promising features of CLT models support affordable rental housing with potential to increase housing stability and decrease displacement within changing neighbourhoods.

Initiative (DSNI) is now the steward for 225 permanently affordable housing units, including 95 fee-simple homeownership units, 77 limited-equity co-operatives and 55 rental units, as well as a community playground and urban farm.[43]

Cooper Square CLT was established in 1991 after several decades of community resistance to urban renewal. Advocacy efforts led to an agreement between the City of New York and a Committee of local residents, leading first to the creation of the Cooper Square Mutual Housing Association (CSMHA) and eventually the Community Land Trust.[44] Cooper Square CLT negotiated with the City to take over existing infrastructure on undervalued land.[45] The Cooper Square CLT owns the land and CSMHA manages the 303 multi-family housing units, 23 commercial units and 19 buildings.[46] In 2007, Cooper Square was among the lowest cost rental housing in New York City's Lower East Side, with affordable housing at less than 25 per cent of the area median income.[47]

OakCLT is a more recent example established during the 2009 housing crisis to stabilize housing in Oakland. Developed through local resident and community organizing, OakCLT focuses on preventing resident displacement in gentrifying neighbourhoods.[48] Since inception, OakCLT has rehabilitated 50 units of affordable housing and has more recently turned its attention to preserving and developing commercial and community spaces.[49]

Locally, the Parkdale Neighbourhood Land Trust (PNLT) is a prominent example of a CLT focused on affordable rentals. Incorporated in 2014, PNLT is a membership-based non-profit open to any resident in the neighbourhood (ward). The governing board consists of tenants, clients and service users, community members and representatives of neighbourhood organizations.[50] The PNLT bought its first 15-unit residential building in 2019 using City of Toronto funds from a pilot project.[51] In 2021, a new residential 36-unit building was purchased without a government backer by raising $2.6 million in donated funds to secure a loan from Vancity Bank.[52] In 2022, the PNLT acquired another 81 units, including some for small businesses, transferred from the City. YWCA of Toronto has entered into an agreement with the PNLT to operate its social housing portfolio. According to PNLT, housing will remain affordable in perpetuity.[53]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make community land trusts more effective:

- weaker housing markets and/or early stages of neighbourhood change, where underused land is available at lower prices;[54]
- municipal governments willing and able to contribute government-owned assets (buildings and land) to the trust;
- diversified CLT portfolios that include rental properties, to help mitigate displacement of renters during neighbourhood change;
- comprehensive wraparound supports for residents, including pre-purchase counselling and education during the homeownership and mortgage application process;[55] and
- expansion of portfolios through land transfer or acquisition, which tends to be more feasible than development.

Connections to other interventions

1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — **7** — 8 — 9

Though acquisition is typically less costly than building new, opportunities for infill development on existing sites could increase options for CLTs. In such cases, **social procurement** could become part of the redevelopment process.

Policy Interventions

4

Rent Control

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Regional and municipal governments

Residential property owners

Rent control generally refers to the category of rent regulation that sets limits on the rent that property owners can charge. Although this can take many forms, in the North American context, "rent control" has become synonymous with rent increase caps.[56] While diverse in application, by providing tenants with a degree of certainty over the cost of rent from year-to-year, rent control aims to provide housing stability and serves as an anti-displacement tool, particularly relevant in strong rental housing markets.[57] Rent control can support the lowest income residents to stay in place as neighbourhoods change and housing becomes more expensive.

There are three main generations of rent control regimes.[58] The first (1920-1980s) had the most stringent controls: rent freezes were put in place to prevent building owners from taking advantage of housing scarcity. The second generation (1970s/'80s-present) includes a more complex set of provisions and is characterized by deregulation, where building owners can raise rent by a certain percent each year, often based on the rate of inflation. This generation tends to target specific housing types (e.g., apartments, multi-family homes) and year of build/residential use.[59] Vacancy control was also introduced during this time, where the rent level of a unit is controlled irrespective of whether the tenant remains in the unit. The third generation (1970s/'80s-present) includes many of the features of the second generation and is characterized by the widespread adoption of vacancy decontrol, where the rent level is controlled only while the existing tenant remains in the unit.[60] Vacancy decontrol is sometimes referred to also as "tenancy termed control" or "tenancy deregulation."

In the United States, rent control tends to be regulated at the municipal level. Two examples with relatively strict rent control measures include New York City and San Francisco. New York adopted the first generation of rent control in 1943. The City currently uses a second generation rent control approach, which allows building owners to raise rents one to two per cent annually, the exact rate of which is determined by a panel of public, tenant and owner representatives.[61] Rent controlled buildings apply to tenants who have lived in the same apartment since 1971 in a building constructed prior to 1947. New York City does not have vacancy controls.

By providing tenants with a degree of certainty over the cost of rent from year-to-year, rent control aims to provide housing stability and serves as an anti-displacement tool, particularly relevant in strong rental housing markets.

Once a tenant vacates a rent-controlled unit, it becomes rent stabilized (approximately 50 per cent of the City's units), meaning the rent remains controlled but can increase higher than the two per cent maximum placed on rent-controlled units.[62]

San Francisco introduced rent control in 1979, where rent increases were capped at seven per cent until 1984. In 1992, the rate changed to be 60 per cent of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Building owners are allowed to increase rent beyond the CPI if capital improvements are made or operating maintenance is required. In these instances, rate increases must be approved by the San Francisco Rent Board. San Francisco is unique in that its rent control is more stringent than the state's law adopted in 2019.[63]

In Canada, rent control falls under provincial jurisdiction, and most provinces have some form of rent control. Manitoba, Ontario and British Columbia have rent controls capping annual rent increases, generally at the rate of inflation, with exceptions related either to the amount of allowable increase or to the kinds of units included or exempted.[64] For example, in Manitoba, if building owners can demonstrate that the allowable rent increase will not cover expenses or if significant renovations have been completed, they may be permitted to raise rent higher than this amount.[65] Similarly, in Ontario, building owners can apply for Above Guideline Rent Increases, or AGIs, to cover the cost of capital repairs, safety and accessibility improvements, and increased property taxes, among other reasons.[66] Whereas British Columbia scrapped exemptions for newly built units in 1980, Ontario and Manitoba continue to allow exemptions for newly built units.[67] In Manitoba, units occupied on or after March 7, 2005 are exempt, while in Ontario the exemption applies to all units occupied for the first time after November 15, 2018.[68]

Vacancy decontrol has become commonplace in both Canada and the United States, with several jurisdictions having removed previously established vacancy control measures. However, with housing affordability deteriorating across North America, despite existing rent control measures in place, vacancy control has gained traction as an effective part of the rental housing affordability solution.[69] Some municipalities have moved toward vacancy control as a rent stabilization effort. In November 2021, voters in Saint Paul, Minnesota, passed a rent control ballot initiative that capped annual rent increases at three per cent, included vacancy control, and did not exempt new construction, nor allow inflation to be added to the allowable rate increase.[70] In Manitoba, building owners can only increase the rent for a recently vacated unit to the average rent of a similar unit in the same residential complex.[71] Manitoba's policy is unique in that it constrains post-tenancy rental increases in rental buildings with four or more units. This policy operates more similarly to tenancy regulation rent control since the price is not necessarily set at the market price but constrained to the average price for a comparable unit, which includes both controlled and uncontrolled properties.[72] At the provincial level, Prince Edward Island is the only Canadian province with vacancy control.[73]

Success of rent control is generally measured by the rate of rent increases and length or security of tenure. Assessing rate of rent increases indicates whether housing remains affordable, and how quickly rent is increasing. Length of tenure serves as a proxy for displacement by correlating rent control and tenants staying in place.

Studies of rent control regimes have connected rent control both to lower rental prices for rent-controlled units, leading to savings for protected tenants, and to enhanced security of tenure.[74] Regarding the latter, researchers attribute increased tenant security to the ability of tenants to plan for their annual rent increases, as well as the existence of wrongful eviction regulations, which regulate allowable offences for eviction.[75] In New York and San Francisco, length of tenure was much higher in rent-controlled units than uncontrolled units and mobility of tenants was significantly lower in rent-controlled units compared to uncontrolled units.[76] San Francisco's policy has resulted in limited displacement and strengthened housing stability for the elderly and racialized groups in particular.[77]

Evidence suggests that type of rent control regime matters for affordability. An analysis of the impact of provincial rent control policies in Toronto, Vancouver and Winnipeg could not find conclusive evidence that rent control has led to lower rents.[78] In Toronto and Vancouver, the introduction of vacancy decontrol—allowing the market to reset rents between tenants—may have negated the impact. And in Winnipeg, despite some post-tenancy constraints, exemptions for higher-priced units targeting wealthier residents may have impacted the policy's ability to keep rents low across the board.[79]

Criticism of rent control policies tends to focus on the impact on production of new rental supply. At one time, the conventional view among economists was that rent control was detrimental to housing affordability in the medium and long term as rent control distorts economic incentives, leading to inefficient distribution of resources, including reducing the incentive of building owners to supply rental units and/or invest in housing quality.[80] Recent studies, however, point to lack of empirical evidence for reduced housing supply as the result of rent control.[81] Policies do not discourage new housing construction in large part because most rent control policies exempt new builds. Further, some argue that a purely economic argument ignores the rights-based approach to housing that some jurisdictions including Canada are transitioning to.[82]

Finally, while new data confirms that rent control and stabilization policies help the lowest-income earners remain in a neighborhood undergoing change, the same data shows the policy can discourage in-migration of new low-income residents.[83] As more people stay in place and turnover of rental units decreases, competition for available units increases, and more moderate to middle income tenants move in.[84] To mitigate this exclusionary impact and address the broader housing crisis, preservation of existing affordable rents must be coupled with development of new market-rate, affordable and deeply affordable units.[85]

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

In Ontario, rent control regimes are established through the *Residential Tenancies Act*, 2006.[86] With updates in 2019 and 2020, residential rental units occupied for the first time after November 15, 2018 are exempt from any rental regulations. Owners of regulated units can adjust rent once per year with 90 days' notice. The province sets the annual rate of increase, usually tied to the Consumer Price Index. In 2019 and 2020, increases were capped at 1.8 per cent and 2.2 per cent respectively. Ontario froze rents in 2021 because of the pandemic. In 2022, rent guidelines allowed for a 1.2 per cent increase. The allowable increase for 2023 has been capped at 2.5 per cent, higher than in previous years but lower than the rate of inflation.[87]

Ontario's current system of vacancy decontrol enables building owners to increase rents dramatically between tenants and has been linked to "renovictions," where building owners evict existing tenants and "up-filter" to high-income tenancies as a revenue-building strategy.[88] The cumulative effect is a cycle of evictions and increased rental prices, making units even less affordable for subsequent tenants.

Since 1997, building owners have also been eligible to seek Above Guideline Increases (AGIs) to request higher increases than the rates set out by the Province because of changes to the unit or building.[89] Vacancy decontrol and AGIs have been in effect in Ontario since policy reforms were brought in through the *Tenant Protection Act*, 1997.[90] Both have been cited as enablers of increased financialization of the GTA's housing market.[91]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make rent control policy more effective at preserving rental housing affordability:

- inclusion of vacancy controls to ensure long-term affordability;
- provisions allowing for building owners to apply for reasonable above guideline rent increases to cover costs of capital improvements focused on enhancing housing quality and comfort for residents;[i]
- a robust anti-eviction regime, especially where there are no vacancy controls in place, to ensure building owners are not incentivized to evict existing tenants so they can reset rent to full market value; and
- comprehensive eviction-prevention services and supports for tenants including education campaigns about tenant rights and the evictions process, services to assist households facing eviction and community legal clinics.

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[i] *Applications must be clearly monitored to ensure building owners do not undertake unnecessary improvements simply so they can charge higher rents.*

Connections to other interventions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 **8** **9**

Rent control could be coupled with other strong tenant protections, including regulations around safe housing conditions and rental housing preservation. When coupled with rent control, policies such as **rental unit replacement** and **right to return requirements** serve as anti-displacement tools by preserving existing affordable rental supply.

Policy Interventions

5 Inclusionary Zoning

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Provincial governments

Regional and municipal governments

Developers

Inclusionary zoning (IZ) is a provincial planning tool that provides municipalities with the mandate to require (when mandatory) or provide incentives (when voluntary) to developers to make a specified percentage, usually 15 to 20 per cent, of new housing development affordable to low- and moderate-income households.[92] Incentives for developers sometimes include fee waivers, expedited building permits, density bonuses or favourable zoning variances. Some IZ policies require developers to build new affordable housing units as part of their development while others allow developers to contribute to an affordable housing fund instead.

Because they are typically tied to specific areas of development/redevelopment, IZ is seen as an explicit attempt to support socially and financially mixed communities. The literature does not describe the direct impacts between inclusionary zoning and displacement but given the high potential for low-income residents' displacement as neighbourhoods change and become more expensive and thus exclusive, inclusionary zoning ensures a percentage of affordable housing in the redeveloped community is attainable to low- and moderate-income residents. Local preference requirements to reserve IZ units for local residents could deepen impact for existing residents.

Inclusionary zoning regimes differ in whether the regimes are mandatory, the share of affordable units required, incomes of targeted households, duration of affordability restrictions, presence and nature of exemptions or triggers, and type and frequency of cost offsets and buyout options. The diversity of IZ regimes allows policymakers to customize the IZ regime adopted in their jurisdiction to the needs and goals of that jurisdiction. In general, IZ regimes provide for affordable units created to remain affordable for between 30 and 99 years, with about a quarter of the jurisdictions securing affordability in perpetuity.[93] Most IZ regimes allow for payments in-lieu and/or the provision of off-site units. IZ regimes can be applied to an entire municipality, or they can be limited to certain areas within a municipality, as is often the case in larger municipalities.

IZ regimes are generally successful at incorporating affordable housing into higher opportunity neighbourhoods.

Inclusionary zoning first rose to prominence in the US suburbs in the 1970s and was originally created to combat homeowner resistance to affordable housing and to make suburbs more inclusive.[94] Montgomery County, Maryland, has the oldest IZ policy in the United States. The regime was introduced in 1974 and has been subject to amendments over the years. The regime currently requires that a minimum 12.5 per cent of all newly developed units meet the county's definition of affordability. The regime provides for a sliding scale that links the percentage of affordable units (between 12.5 and 15 per cent) to the amount of density bonus units a developer can accommodate, with a maximum density bonus of 22 per cent. There is a lower requirement for central business districts and transit-oriented development zones in recognition of the higher cost of developing in these areas. The control period has been doubled over the course of the regime to 99 years for rental units and 30 years for owner-occupied units.[95]

Immediate success of IZ measures tends to focus on number of affordable units built because of the policy. For example, as of 2016, the Montgomery County regime had produced more than 15,000 total units over the life of the policy, roughly 3,500 of which were still under affordability controls. Production of affordable units fluctuates between 77 and 1,200 units annually. Variations in annual production highlight the IZ regime's dependence on private developers, whose capacity to develop affordable units is subject to the fluctuations of the real estate market. Given developable land is becoming increasingly scarce and infill development in higher density neighbourhoods tends to be more complex and costly, the rate of affordable unit production in Montgomery Country is expected to decline.[96]

Beyond production of affordable units, larger-scale and longer-term metrics for success of IZ regimes have included producing mixed-income neighbourhoods. The literature indicates that IZ regimes are generally successful at incorporating affordable housing into higher opportunity neighbourhoods. Whether mixed-income neighbourhoods are inherently beneficial for inclusive communities is an area of active debate within the literature.[97] Empirical data on the social and economic benefits remain ambiguous.[98] While some argue that mixed-income communities create more social mixing and better opportunities for low-to-moderate income members, others have noted that mixed-income communities can be detrimental to community cohesion and activism.

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

In 2019, the Government of Ontario ordered municipalities in the Greater Golden Horseshoe to review their Official Plans, with the goal of increasing the creation of new housing.[99] Building on previously initiated analyses, Peel, Toronto and York Region moved to implement IZ bylaws into their municipal official plans. Toronto was the first municipality to seek Ministerial approval for its IZ framework. By 2021, the City of Toronto had completed the necessary housing assessment; market impact assessment; IZ bylaws and an amendment to the Official Plan.[100]

Toronto's proposed IZ policy features phased requirements, starting with five to 10 per cent affordable in 2022 and rising to eight to 22 per cent in 2030, depending on whether affordable units are based on affordable rental or ownership models. Toronto will be split into three IZ areas with varying rates. From 2022-2024:[101]

- The downtown area (IZ1) has the highest rates: seven per cent if the developer is adding affordable rentals and 10 per cent if the developer is adding affordable home ownership.
- Areas surrounding the downtown (IZ2) have moderate rates: six per cent if the developer is adding affordable rentals and eight per cent if the developer is adding affordable home ownership.
- Scarborough, North York and Etobicoke (IZ3) have the lowest rates: five per cent if the developer is adding affordable rentals and seven per cent if the developer is including affordable home ownership.

Peel and York Region encourage their lower municipalities to implement IZ policies, including following through with the impact assessments required through the *Planning Act*, 1990.[102] In Peel Region, Mississauga council has adopted an IZ policy that applies to developments with 50+ units and 3,600+ square meters of new gross floor area.[103] Mississauga set the current rates at 1.5 per cent to 10 per cent depending on the area and whether the units supplied are affordable rental or affordable home ownership. These rates are set to increase to 2.5 per cent to 10 per cent by 2025. Brampton has communicated that it will draft IZ policies for council consideration in 2023.[104] Caledon plans to embed IZ through their Official Plan Review.[105] Their draft Official Plan states Caledon will attempt to achieve a minimum of 10 per cent of gross floor area or equivalent percentage of units where the market permits.

York Region's new Official Plan affirms support for the use of IZ as a tool. The three most populated York Region municipalities—Markham, Vaughan and Richmond Hill—are completing the necessary impact assessments and drafting policies.[106] The remaining six local municipalities have not yet released detailed plans for implementation.

More Homes Built Faster Act, 2022: Changing Ontario's Affordable Housing Landscape

The *More Homes Built Faster Act*, 2022, passed on November 28, 2022, is the Government of Ontario's response to the housing crisis. The Act proposes significant changes to legislation and regulations affecting several aspects of housing development and preservation, including two of the interventions identified in this report: inclusionary zoning and rental unit replacement.

Implications for Inclusionary Zoning

Proposed regulatory amendments would cap the share of IZ units required at five per cent, limit affordability timelines to 25 years and set the price thresholds for IZ affordable ownership and rental units at a minimum of 80 per cent of average resale purchase price or average market rent, respectively.[107] These changes are likely to affect the rollout of IZ in the GTA in several ways. At minimum, the legislation will delay implementation by requiring that Mississauga and Toronto amend their recently adopted IZ policies to reduce their established targets, while other municipalities may need to adjust plans currently in development.

Affordable housing advocates have raised concerns with the proposed new parameters for IZ, noting the thresholds, which are substantially lower than other global cities, will not address core housing need.[108] Caps on affordability targets would reduce those under current IZ policies by as much as 17 per cent. Similarly, in some cases, timelines for retaining affordability would decrease by as much as 74 years, down to 25 years from 99 years, putting Ontario IZ out of sync not only with good practices from other jurisdictions but also local thresholds established through market studies.[109]

Implications for Rental Unit Replacement

The *More Homes Built Faster Act*, 2022 empowers the province to impose limits and conditions on municipal demolition and conversion bylaws. Rental replacement policies are currently in place or under consideration in several municipalities across Peel, Toronto and York Region (see spotlight section under **rental unit replacement** for more details). Municipal and housing stakeholders have highlighted concerns that any dilution of existing protections could incentivize the purchase and demolition of affordable rental units and undermine municipalities' ability to preserve existing affordable rental housing stock, increasing housing instability for renters.[110]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make inclusionary zoning policies more effective at supporting affordable housing production:

- mandatory policies with clear requirements for quantity of units, depth of affordability and duration of affordability set at the highest level of affordability the market can sustain;[111]
- regulations ensuring full integration of affordable units when built into the larger development, with same quality of construction, same entrances and same access to common areas;[112]
- open dialogue and engagement of both for-profit and not-for-profit developers in policy development, to ensure feasibility of implementation;[113]
- public investment to support maintenance and preservation of affordable units;[114]
- strong housing markets where developers have opportunities to generate large profit margins from development projects;[115]
- careful tracking of relevant statistics by governments to allow for more extensive analysis of impact;[116] and
- strong administrative capacity of municipal governments, who must coordinate among several agencies managing developer applicant services, data and inventory management, building agreements, affordable unit pricing, planning and project review, site plan compliance and enforcement, alternative agreements and occupancy and resale.[117]

Connections to other interventions

1 2 **3** 4 5 6 7 8 9

Where permanent affordability is a goal and requirement of IZ policy, local governments might consider encouraging developers to sell their affordable homes to a designated local **community land trust** that can ensure the homes remain affordable in perpetuity. In these cases the government would enter a formal partnership with the land trust to facilitate transfer of properties from developers to the trust.

Policy Interventions

6 Linkage Fees

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Provincial governments

Regional and municipal governments

Developers

Linkage fees are charged to developers to offset the impact new development has on government services and are dedicated to city infrastructure such as affordable housing, transit, daycare and parks.[118] Linkage fees allow cities to shift revenues raised from high development areas to neighbourhoods with less real estate revenue in higher need of housing and/or community amenities.[119] While linkage fees generate needed revenues for municipalities, municipalities must still acquire or leverage existing land to build amenities such as affordable housing.

Linkage fees have been around since the 1920s in the United States, where cities required developers to build all subdivision infrastructure (e.g., streets and sidewalks). Residents eventually requested developers dedicate land within their project for other types of infrastructure, such as schools, police stations and parks. In cases where project land was not appropriate for amenities, government required developers to dedicate offsite land for those purposes, and eventually developed in-lieu fees as well.[120] Unlike in-lieu fees that offer a fee as an alternative to building amenities, linkage fee programs require the fee in order to build new developments.[121] They are also distinct from community benefits zoning allowances like Toronto's Section 37, since they charge a fee to developers that can be transferred to other neighbourhoods, rather than request an amenity for the neighbourhood in which the development occurs.[122] As such, linkage fees can be contentious with developers who view them as an additional tax.[123]

Boston's linkage fee program was established in 1983 by the outgoing mayor to encourage development in neighbourhoods other than downtown.[124] A fee of $5.00 per square foot was added to new commercial projects over 100,000 square feet, with payment required within 12 years. The Neighbourhood Housing Trust was subsequently established in 1986 to manage the funds, and an additional $1.00 per square foot was added for job training and inputted into the Neighbourhood Jobs Trust, established in 1987, to save funds for training programs. The period of payment was also shortened to seven years.[125] By 2016, the fee was $8.34 per square foot and the scope was expanded to apply also to phased Master Plans of institutions (e.g., health and education) that may develop in smaller phases over longer periods of time. Boston charges the same fee per square foot

Linkage fees allow cities to shift revenues raised from high development areas to neighbourhoods with less real estate revenue in higher need of housing and/or community amenities.

for a variety of projects, regardless of location, unlike most cities, which calculate charges based on project type or location.[126] Between 1986 and 2021, linkage fees garnered more than $133.8 million in revenue and led to the development or preservation of 10,176 affordable units in 193 projects in Boston.[127]

Linkage fees can also be used to leverage commercial development to increase affordable housing stock, as is the case in Boston, where developers can partner with community groups to build affordable housing instead of paying a fee.

Sacramento's Housing Trust Fund (HTF) was created in 1989 amidst concerns by the City that the residential suburb of North Natomas was developing too rapidly and would eventually lead to an imbalance of new jobs and new housing. The City enacted the HTF Ordinance into its zoning code to support development of affordable housing near emerging employment zones in North Natomas and elsewhere across the City.[128] Between 1989 and 2013, Sacramento levied $25 million in commercial linkage fees used to provide gap financing to accelerate 3,095 affordable housing units in 44 development projects across the City.[129]

While there is considerable literature and evaluation on linkage fees, it tends to focus on economic impacts (i.e., revenue totals) and amenity production (i.e., number of units or amenities developed or preserved) and not on broader neighbourhood-level impacts. So, while linkage fees have been established in some cases in direct response to concerns around neighbourhood change, as in the Sacramento case above, it is unclear the extent to which the fees have supported mitigation of displacement.[130] Despite evidence quantifying the amount of affordable housing produced, further research on the potential of linkage fees to mitigate displacement and improve opportunities for low-income residents is warranted.

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

Linkage fees are a growth-related funding tool that is not currently being used by any municipality in the GTA. While there is currently no legal mechanism to implement linkage fees, Ontario's *Planning Act,* 1990 and *Development Charges Act,* 1997 allow municipalities to levy development charges and community benefits charges.[131] Unlike linkage fees, development charges and community benefits charges are limited to the development area.[132]

Development charges may only be used for services outlined in the Act, such as water supply, wastewater, storm water, highway services, electrical power, subway extension, transit services, waste diversion, policing, fire protection, ambulance, libraries, long-term care, parks and recreation services (except land acquisition), public health, childcare, housing, bylaw enforcement and emergency preparedness.[133] The *Development Charges Act,* 1997 allows for the same services to be funded through community benefits charges (*Planning Act*, 1990 s 37), if they are not capital costs covered under the *Development Charges Act,* 1997.

Community benefits charges can pay part of the capital investments in local priorities as directed through municipal community benefits charges plans.[134] In the GTA, the priorities include infrastructure and services such as affordable housing, heritage assets, parks, parking, community art, civic administration, community facilities, waste management, protective services and some transportation expenses.

Lessons Learned

Several factors make linkage fees more effective at supporting affordable housing production and preservation:

- inclusion of coverage for rehabilitation and preservation of existing affordable rental alongside new construction;[135]
- flexibility in how fees are charged (i.e., per square foot of development space or per development project) and applied (i.e., for affordable housing or other neighbourhood amenities; in specific areas of a city or for development in all areas of city) to ensure they meet community needs; and
- strong real estate markets where developers have opportunities to generate large profit margins from development projects.[136]

Connections to other interventions

1 2 3 4 **5** 6 7 **8** **9**

Given their unique roles in encouraging inclusive development, jurisdictions may opt to enact both **inclusionary zoning** and linkage fees. These should also be considered along with complementary supportive policies to mitigate displacement, such as **rental unit replacement** and **right to return requirements**.

Policy Interventions

7 Social Procurement

Social procurement criteria is a measure implemented by municipalities to incorporate equity into procurement processes for local projects. Specific guidance typically indicates that efforts should include equity participation, workplace and supplier diversity, wraparound services and supportive strategies. Social procurement reflects the growing awareness in municipalities and organizations of how systemic discrimination adversely impacts equity-deserving groups.[137] Embedding social procurement criteria in requests for proposals (RFPs) seeks to provide economic opportunities to systemically disadvantaged groups and strengthen investments in minority-based enterprises.

Social procurement can also apply to economic development initiatives. In 2009, Philadelphia established the Office of Economic Opportunity, which promotes the economic development of small businesses owned by equity deserving groups. In 2010, the City released its Inclusion Works Strategic Plan, mapping out a strategy to help equity deserving businesses become prime contractors by reforming the City's certification process, improving contracting data collection and including steps to specifically diversify construction contracting.[138] To enhance implementation efforts, the City engages partners from the quasi-public and not-for-profit sector.[139]

Success of social procurement programs and policies is typically assessed based on whether threshold targets were met. Philadelphia initially set a 32 per cent diversity target for economic development of "minority, women, disabled and disadvantaged" small businesses (M/W/DSBEs) through its registration program and contract review and monitoring activities. Once the target was met, it was raised to 35 per cent. Since 2015, the City of Philadelphia has awarded $1.59 billion to M/W/DSBEs and increased the number of certified businesses to 2,272, a 72 per cent increase since 2010.[140]

Through its Social Procurement Program, the City of Toronto aims to "embed supply chain diversity and workforce development initiatives within the City's Procurement Processes to drive inclusive economic growth" with a focus on providing opportunities to equity deserving communities.[141] Adopted by City Council in 2016, the policy applies to competitive purchases over $3,000 for contracts with the City and builds on Toronto's established community benefits initiatives focused on supplier diversity and workforce development. Neighbourhood-specific examples of social procurement include: Regent Park Revitalization, where 582 jobs were created for local residents between 2009 and 2019 as a result of the revitalization CBA; development of 1652 Keele Street Hub, where 10 local youth were hired as apprentices to build

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Regional and municipal governments

Builders and developers

Anchor institutions and businesses

Local small businesses

There is some evidence that speaks to broader beneficial impacts of social procurement, beyond the initial bid.

a youth center; Waterfront Toronto Employment Initiative, which connects residents to employment and training opportunities generated by waterfront revitalization projects; and Rexdale – Casino Woodbine CBA, which made a commitment to local and social hiring and supply chain diversity.[142] The latter achieved 72 per cent local and social hires, well exceeding its 40 per cent target, and spent $3.63 million on social procurement contracts from 2018-2020. Another prominent example is the 2015 PanAm/Parapan Am Games, where diverse suppliers represented 20 per cent of vendors and nine per cent of the total procurement spend. Additionally, outside of the Games, 168 contracts between $3,000 and $100,000 were given to 32 diverse suppliers (total value of $3 million).[143]

Boston, Massachusetts, institutionalized social procurement requirements for all public development projects in 2014.[144] Social procurement is adopted on a case-by-case basis for parcels of land owned by the City of Boston and the Massachusetts Department of Transportation. Massport, the port authority that owns and operates three airports and public terminals in the Port of Boston, adopted a 25 per cent diversity, equity and inclusion criteria in government development RFPs, specifying several equity considerations, including equity participation, workplace and supplier diversity and wraparound services, amongst others.[145] Massport's model has spawned a series of similar programmes across the Boston region.[146]

Returning to our local context, York University (YorkU) established a social procurement policy in 2019, enabling integration of workforce development and supplier diversity criteria in bids for construction projects, goods and services.[147] Major projects, including construction of a new Markham Campus and a new School of Continuing Studies, have embedded social and community benefit into bid documents, requiring hard targets on trade apprenticeship opportunities for equity deserving groups, local hires and spending towards local social enterprise and certified diverse suppliers.[148] As of December 2022, $5.8 million has been spent on contracts with diverse vendors and social enterprises, 57 apprentices have been hired and social procurement requirements have been applied to 14 construction projects at York U.[149] In addition, in collaboration with other Toronto-area anchor institutions, YorkU has developed a portal for diverse suppliers and social enterprises designed to facilitate access for businesses facing barriers to certification, signalling a shift towards a more flexible approach to supplier diversity.[150]

As noted in the above examples, because success is often determined by output—achievement of set targets connected to specific development projects—it is difficult to evaluate success in terms of broader impact on recipient communities. However, there is some evidence that speaks to broader beneficial impacts, beyond the initial bid. In the Massport example, the companies owned by racialized peoples who were involved in the initial winning bid, once considered too small to bid for a megaproject, are now attached to other big projects because of their experience in the initial winning bid.[151]

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

City of Brampton, City of Mississauga, Peel Region and City of Toronto all have active social procurement policies and/or supplier diversity initiatives in place. Richmond Hill and Vaughan established new procurement bylaws in 2017, with York Region following in 2021, that include non-binding language encouraging social procurement as part of procurement principles.

The City of Brampton adopted a new municipal purchasing bylaw in 2018 supporting "sustainable and ethical procurement" and launched a Supply Chain Diversity Program in 2020 that applies to competitive invitational procurement processes.[152] The program requires at least one bid invitation be directed to a certified diverse supplier for purchases of goods and services between $25,000 and $100,000. Bidders must meet all specifications and pricing requirements and no preferential treatment is provided.[153]

The City of Mississauga established a Sustainable Procurement Policy in 2018 that allows all new bids on goods and services to include environmental and social considerations (including supplier diversity) in procurement evaluation criteria/requirements.[154] Mississauga's program conducts its own independent verification of supplier diversity and engages with equity-deserving communities to inform program design.

Peel Region enacted a new regional procurement bylaw in 2018 enabling the necessary authorities for social/sustainable procurement policies and procedures. A regional pilot program was approved and funded in 2022 to embed social procurement into select Region of Peel invitational procurement opportunities for diverse vendors, with anticipated launch in 2023 followed by an organization-wide rollout.[155]

The City of Toronto adopted a Social Procurement Program in 2016 that included a new policy authorizing staff to embed supply chain diversity and workforce development in City procurement. Staff must seek at least one quote from a certified diverse supplier for purchases of goods and services between $3,000 and $50,000 and can prioritize supplier diversity in bid evaluation criteria for contracts $50,000 and up. The Social Procurement Program has selected more than 50 contracts that include workforce development and supply chain diversity requirements and issued a total of $4.5 million in City contracts to diverse suppliers from 2017-2019.[156]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make social procurement policies more effective:

- allowing for flexibility of social procurement criteria can encourage creativity in how respondents might deliver their commitment to diversity, equity and inclusion;
- explicitly naming inclusion of equity participation and wraparound services as required criteria;[157]
- awarding greater value to proposals where proponents have their own internal diversity, equity and inclusion policies;
- partnering with community organizations to help build community capacity and deepen engagement with small businesses around opportunities;
- labour markets with adequate workforce supply (i.e., qualified local workers) to fulfill larger contracts;[158]
- intentional outreach and investment to encourage groups that have been outside of trades opportunities to pursue a career in trades and help bridge any workforce shortage;
- mechanisms to ensure the policy is adhered to; and
- mechanisms to track and evaluate implementation of social procurement criteria written into RFP submissions.

Connections to other interventions

Social procurement policies are most effective when coupled with **workforce agreements** and **neighbourhood-level workforce development programs** to help ensure the necessary supply of workers targeted for diversity, equity and inclusion opportunities. Adequate training might be required to ensure social procurement contracts can meet diversity, equity and inclusion requirements as well as support for diverse bidders to know how to apply for RFPs through the city.

Policy Interventions

8

Rental Unit Replacement

WHO'S INVOLVED:

Regional and municipal governments

Developers

Residential property owners

Rental unit replacement, or No Net Loss, policies are a municipal requirement that rental housing be maintained or replaced one-for-one at similar rents in the event of renovation, conversion or demolition.[159] It is primarily a means to preserve existing rental housing stock that is affordable. In some cases, rental unit replacement has a stipulation that tenants relocated because of renovation, demolition or redevelopment have the **right to return** to a unit of similar type, size and at the same rent. Rental unit replacement policies generally come into effect when a threshold is met (e.g., when six or more residential units are affected).[160]

In the United States, No Net Loss policies typically cover affordable housing within specified neighbourhoods or redevelopment projects while Canadian cities tend to apply rental unit replacement policies to different housing types city-wide. While rental replacement policies can successfully replace existing housing stock, they do not create opportunities to add to it. Evaluation of one-to-one rental unit replacement policies tends to focus on number of units replaced, as measured against defined targets. In part because these policies are relatively new in many jurisdictions, little evaluation exploring the effectiveness of rental replacement as an anti-displacement policy exists. However, given growing calls to maintain and preserve existing affordable rental housing stock, alongside development of new affordable and deeply affordable housing, rental unit replacement policy is a critical lever with potential to address deteriorating affordability and displacement, or simply to maintain existing levels of affordability, though insufficient in several contexts.[161]

Initiated in 2001, Portland's No Net Loss policy aims to preserve affordable housing in the Central City. The policy applies to preservation and renovation projects and is available to individuals or families earning up to 60 per cent of Area Median Income.[162] To ensure renewed stock is matched to the needs of residents, Portland conducts a housing stock inventory every three years of all residential properties in Central City. There is conflicting evidence around the long-term success of Portland's No Net Loss policy. It is clear the policy has worked to preserve some housing, but whether it has met its target has been a point of contention. A 2008

Rental unit replacement policy is a critical lever with potential to address deteriorating affordability and displacement.

report indicates the City surpassed its 2002 target by building 8,473 units of affordable housing, exceeding the benchmark of 8,286 units.[163] More recently though, a newspaper report indicated the policy fell short of replacing affordable housing by 1,468 units.[164]

As a result of community advocacy, Los Angeles instituted a No Net Loss Policy for a downtown redevelopment project in 2006. The plan calls for no net loss on low-income housing in the downtown redevelopment area with a baseline of 9,000 units, of which the City cannot go below.[165] Los Angeles conducted an audit prior to its downtown redevelopment to inform this baseline.[166] Since 2006, almost 2,000 units have been replaced and reserved for low-income tenants.

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

In Ontario, rental replacement is enabled through rental demolition and conversion bylaws allowed under the *Municipal Act,* 2001 through an amendment in 2006.[167] The *Municipal Act,* 2001 allows municipalities to create bylaws related to demolition and conversion of buildings with six or more residential units. Municipalities often add a vacancy rate threshold to activate the bylaw only when vacancy rates are under a certain percentage.

Several Peel Region municipalities have implemented some form of rental demolition and conversion control.

Brampton's rental unit replacement policies only apply to conversions of rental buildings to condominiums.[168] There are more expansive changes under consideration through the Official Plan review that could require replacement of comparable affordable units in any building with six or more residential units.[169]

In Mississauga, applications to demolish or convert any residential property of more than six units require a permit.[170] Rental units may be built on site, at a similar site or cash can be paid to the City in lieu for use on future development. There is also a stipulation that tenants of conversions have the **right to return**, but that does not apply to demolitions. Having come into effect in 2019, Mississauga's rental unit replacement policy has not been evaluated or audited.

Caledon's new Official Plan, up for adoption in 2023, proposes a similar framework to Mississauga's, including tenant relocation assistance.[171]

The City of Toronto implemented a one-for-one replacement of rental housing at similar rents in 2007. The policy allows the City to "prohibit and regulate the demolition of residential rental properties and may prohibit and regulate the conversion of residential rental properties to a purpose other than the purpose of a residential rental property."[172] This applies to buildings where six or more existing rental units with affordable or mid-range rents are proposed to be demolished, whether traditional market or not-for-profit housing. The policy requires that rental units be replaced with the same number and type of rental units, that tenants displaced as a result of renovation/ redevelopment have a **right to return** to a unit the same size/ type (also known as the right of first refusal) and that replacement units are offered at the same rent (with increases in line with provincial rent control guidelines). Since Toronto's rental unit replacement policy was adopted, 2,500 affordable rental units have been approved for replacement (1,200 private and almost 1,300 social housing).[173]

In York Region, seven municipalities currently have rental demolition and conversion bans. These bans prevent development of existing residential units when vacancy rates are 3 per cent or lower but lack specificity about unit replacement. Markham is the only York Region municipality that currently specifies rental units must be replaced with affordable units. Richmond Hill has included a rental unit replacement policy in their Official Plan, currently under consideration.

The *More Homes Built Faster Act*, 2022 gives the Minister of Municipal Affairs and Housing authority to impose limits and conditions on municipal demolition and conversion bylaws. The government of Ontario is currently reviewing feedback on these changes before finalizing regulations.[174]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make rental unit replacement policies more effective at preserving the quantity and quality of existing affordable rental housing units:

- mechanisms to actively monitor and enforce rental unit replacement agreements;[175]
- regulations ensuring long-term affordability of replacement units;
- clear guidelines and supports for renters to help them understand the policy and ensure their rights are being protected by helping them obtain access to replacement rental units; and
- proactive assessment of existing rental stock in communities through neighbourhood household audits or inventories to inform needs and ensure replacement units are aligned to those needs.[176]

Connections to other interventions

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Rental unit replacement and **right to return requirements** are intertwined. Right to return is rendered ineffective without one-to-one unit replacement (see right to return requirements, below). The policies are complementary and work together to enable both preservation of existing affordable housing and production of new affordable housing.

Other interventions that encourage development and new production of affordable housing are needed as well, such as **community land trusts, inclusionary zoning** and **linkage fees**. Further, **rent control** with vacancy control can guarantee that housing remain affordable into the long-term.

9

Right to Return Requirements

Right to return policies (or right *of* return) offer residents the opportunity to return to their neighbourhood or building after they are temporarily relocated due to redevelopment or renovation. Resident engagement in right to return criteria has been shown to lead to a higher return rate to the neighbourhood.

Since evictions can lead to permanent displacement for low-income residents in changing neighbourhoods, right to return aims to ensure that those directly impacted by redevelopment maintain affordable housing and have an opportunity to return to their community upon completion. It is valuable in any redevelopment or renovation project to prevent the permanent displacement of renters, whether in social or market housing. When applied to private housing, it tends to be a requirement of a city's **rental unit replacement** policy. For example, under *Ontario's Residential Tenancies Act*, 2006, building owners can terminate a lease if they need access for renovations or repairs. With a right to return policy in place, residents have the right to return to their units upon completion of the renovation or repair.[177]

While there is clear evidence that right to return policies provide protections to those most vulnerable to being permanently displaced due to redevelopment or revitalization, the policy may contribute to broader positive or negative impacts, depending on the case and the kinds of additional supports provided.[178] Some critics have noted the relocation of residents to a different neighbourhood can pose challenges to a resident's daily life, impacting their routines, commute times and social network connections. Moreover, the fundamentally changed nature of the community residents return to may be potentially damaging to the social fabric of the original community.[179]

There are several notable examples of right to return policies across North America implemented to varying degrees of success. Launched in 1992, HOPE VI is considered an unsuccessful but influential example of right to return. The US program, funded by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was a large-scale social housing redevelopment program aimed at bringing a mix of incomes into low-income

WHO'S INVOLVED:

- Regional and municipal governments
- Developers
- Residential property owners
- Community housing providers

Right to return is valuable in any redevelopment or renovation project to prevent the permanent displacement of renters, whether in social or market housing.

neighbourhoods. Right to return was not a focus of HOPE VI and was not contractually required for developers to receive HUD funds. In other words, right to return was not tied to funding. And, despite technically being included as a goal in HOPE VI, right to return eligibility was so strict that only a small percentage (20 per cent) would qualify, despite 75 per cent expressing interest in returning. Further, even when right to return was identified and featured as a policy, as in Chicago's HOPE VI, redevelopment included fewer social housing units, rendering it impossible for every resident to return. Indeed, only an estimated 11.4 per cent of residents returned to the redeveloped neighbourhood.[180]

HUD's more recent Rental Assistance Demonstration program (RAD), initiated in 2013, has been much more successful. The program, which provides funds to public housing authorities to convert public housing to either project-based vouchers or project-based rental assistance, requires grantees to abide to right to return. Therefore, in instances where projects include conversions, every resident has a right to return to their unit or one of an equivalent size or larger once the work is completed. A 2017 evaluation of the RAD program found that only 2.3 per cent of residents did not return to their original unit or another unit in subsidized housing. It is unclear whether those who moved to another subsidized unit remained within their original neighbourhood.[181]

Similar to the HOPE VI program, Toronto's Regent Park revitalization, initiated in 2005, aims to bring a mix of housing and income types into the exclusively social housing neighbourhood of Regent Park. After significant resident advocacy, the City of Toronto and TCHC (the social housing steward responsible for redevelopment), agreed to a one-to-one replacement of rent geared to income housing coupled with a right to return mandate.[182] Residents have continued their advocacy throughout the stages of redevelopment, advocating for changes after the first phase of redevelopment in how long and how far from their community residents would be temporarily relocated and where in the neighbourhood they would live upon return. Residents also called for a reassessment of eligibility requirements. Where in phase one residents who accepted off-site relocation during that phase forfeited their right to return, in later phases, accepting off-site accommodation was removed from the eligibility criteria.[183]

As of mid-2021, between phases one to three (of five), 56 per cent of relocated Regent Park residents had returned to the neighbourhood.[184] Notwithstanding these early indicators of success, it is important to note some tensions emerging in the redeveloped community, with little social mixing between residents of the TCHC apartments and the market condominiums. Some TCHC residents have described "a sense of loss about the more tight-knit community that existed previously."[185]

More recently, right to return has extended beyond residents directly impacted by relocation during redevelopment projects. In Portland's North/Northeast (N/NE) community, a once majority-Black neighbourhood that, by 2010, had lost two-thirds of its Black community members to displacement and gentrification, former residents are placed in a priority program to return to the neighbourhood for rental or ownership opportunities if they "were displaced, are at risk of displacement, or are the descendants of families displaced due to urban renewal in N/NE Portland."[186] The policy is part of Portland's Fair Housing Plan, which aims to "advance racial equity through reparative action" and applies specifically to this one neighbourhood.[187] A key aspect of the strategy is a Preference Policy that prioritizes affordable rental and homeownership applicants. As of 2021, Portland's strategy had created 500 units of affordable housing and created opportunities for 100 first-time homebuyers to buy within the neighbourhood.

Evaluation of the strategy has also measured the importance of the neighbourhood to residents—specifically measuring ties to the community, social networks and opportunities for civic engagement.[188] We know from our own research on social capital how critical social networks and community connections are to individual and community health and well-being.[189] In N/NE Portland, residents who have returned to the neighbourhood have reported improvements to well-being, citing lower levels of perceived prejudice, high levels of belonging to the neighbourhood and enhanced opportunities for community engagement.[190] As in the Regent Park case, the report also identifies several threats to resident well-being, including insufficient affordable stores and amenities, limited employment opportunities in the neighbourhood and persistent racial and economic inequality. Nonetheless, it concludes that "the N/NE Preference Policy is, in many ways, serving the intended population, and benefiting both residents and the broader community."[191]

Spotlight on Peel, Toronto and York Region:

Right to return requirements are embedded in the **rental unit replacement** policies described in the previous section. While Peel, Toronto and York Region's official plans embed the regulation of demolition and conversion, only Toronto and Peel have rental replacement frameworks in place that enshrine right to return for tenants. York Region has adopted a policy banning rental conversion and demolition when vacancy rates are three per cent or lower and so lacks the necessary rental replacement framework for tenant relocation requirements.

In Peel Region, the Official Plan, approved in 2022, states that tenant relocation and assistance should be considered as part of the rental replacement bylaws for properties with six units or more. Under Mississauga's Rental Housing Protection By-Law, enacted in 2019, tenants are given the right to first refusal of affordable units.[192] In Brampton, the current Official Plan allows for a rental replacement bylaw but does not embed the policy.[193] In Caledon, the current Official Plan encourages replacement or preservation, while the Official Plan in consultation for 2023 goes further, requiring an acceptable tenant relocation and assistance plan, along with tenants' right to return to occupy a replacement unit at similar rent, provisional accommodation at similar rent and other assistance to lessen hardship.[194]

The City of Toronto's rental replacement bylaw requires developers to provide tenants the right to return to the same size and type of unit at similar rents, with an allowance for annual rent increases meeting provincial rent guidelines, a one-time four per cent increase in rent, alternative provisional accommodation at similar rents and other assistance to lessen hardship (e.g., housing support workers for tenants experiencing vulnerabilities).[195]

Lessons Learned

Several factors make right to return requirements more effective:

- strong tenant advocacy and influence over how the policy will be implemented;
- clear and fair eligibility requirements;
- clarity on exactly where tenants will live during and after redevelopment;
- complementary one-to-one **rental unit replacement** policy;
- mandated requirements for right to return tied to project funding and approvals;
- mechanisms for consistent monitoring and evaluation of the policy to ensure implementation and accountability;[196]
- comprehensive wraparound supports for residents both during and after relocation, especially when residents return to fundamentally changed, mixed-income neighbourhoods; and
- comprehensive research and evaluation examining the long-term impacts on residents of returning to a changed community, including identification of good practices and lessons learned to inform future neighbourhood redevelopment projects.

Connections to other interventions

1 — 2 — 3 — 4 — 5 — 6 — 7 — 8 — 9

Right to return policies and **rental unit replacement** are intertwined: right to return is rendered ineffective without one-to-one unit replacement. The policies are complementary and work together to enable both preservation of existing affordable housing and production of new affordable housing. However, evidence indicates right to return is not sufficient on its own to ensure communities remain inclusive and affordable to lower-income residents.[197] **Rent control,** including strong vacancy control measures, can ensure the affordable housing stock remains even if new tenants occupy the unit.

In addition, thoughtful relocation planning, and complementary interventions such as **workforce agreements, neighbourhood-level workforce development programs** and **social procurement** can be deployed to mitigate risks and realize benefits for underemployed residents and equity-deserving groups.

Strengthening the Ecosystem

The program and policy interventions described in this report have the potential to make cities across the GTA more sustainable and inclusive. When stacked together and alongside other equity-informed practices, these methods should be considered part of the solution to the combined challenges of affordability, inequitable access to opportunity and social exclusion characterizing the region.

Drawing lessons from the implementation of the nine profiled interventions, this section outlines additional considerations for maximizing the impact of interventions for more inclusive communities.

Strengthening the Ecosystem

To have impact, multiple program and policy interventions are necessary.

To build inclusive communities and support equitable growth, multiple interventions are necessary. No single intervention, whether the ones included in this report or otherwise, is able or designed to address all the ways neighbourhood change affects a community. For example, implementation of **social procurement** can facilitate inclusive economic opportunity but may not address the need for affordable housing in a community. Layering in policies focused on affordability like comprehensive **rent control, inclusionary zoning** and **rental unit replacement** can contribute to more comprehensive and tangible neighbourhood-level impacts.

A shared vision for community change can guide investment and inform decisions and advocacy around proposed interventions.

A vision for community co-created by residents, community agencies, philanthropic organizations, anchor institutions, governments, local business owners, developers and other partners provides a shared understanding of existing challenges and ambitions related to redevelopment and neighbourhood change processes. A shared vision is a mechanism to ground stakeholders in agreed upon community outcomes, aided by supportive interventions.

This research shows that when existing communities drive the vision and advocate for their needs in the face of neighbourhood change, the impact of interventions is greater. Resident engagement and local decision-making is essential to actualizing a community vision for change.

Additionally, some interventions discussed in this report, like **rent control** and **right to return requirements**, take place at the provincial or municipal level but nonetheless have significant impacts on residents and businesses at the local level.

Strengthening the Ecosystem

Trusted local partners play a pivotal role in convening and supporting dialogue and trust building across diverse stakeholders.

The program and policy tools of governments are often large-scale and broad reaching, but neighbourhood change happens and is felt locally. To figure out how government and corporate-led interventions are going to be felt in specific communities, these entities benefit from engaging with trusted local partners who can provide insight on the community-level impact of public and private investments, including identification of supportive interventions focused on enhancing benefits to residents who may experience a disproportionately negative impact of change processes. Local partners may take a variety of forms—local business owners, community service agencies, philanthropic organizations, religious leaders or many others—and will vary by neighbourhood.

Many examples of the interventions featured in this report include stories of communities eager to engage in visioning and planning conversations to help inform and guide decisions but who are doubtful of government and corporate sector's commitment to the needs and ambitions of the community. Building trust among stakeholders takes time and can be facilitated by trusted intermediaries, but also requires government and corporate partners to provide clear, tangible benefits to community partners that reflect the diverse aspirations of the community.

Neighbourhood change is a complex process and the potential for interventions to influence impact decreases as the change cycle advances.

Identifying community risks and applying interventions centred on protections and benefits to the community early in the regional and municipal change process is most effective. Researchers and community and philanthropic organizations that can monitor and identify emerging changes at a neighbourhood level can help communities initiate early conversations among residents, governments, planners, developers and other actors to ensure changes are equitable and inclusive. Where interventions involve acquiring and holding onto community assets, starting discussions early can also have the quantifiable benefit of lower prices and less competition for community assets. As the neighbourhood change cycle advances, there are fewer untapped opportunities, making community organizations more reliant on government to provide the funding necessary to intervene in and leverage community change and revitalization efforts for community benefit.

Strengthening the Ecosystem

Being clear on intended outcomes is critical to evaluating and learning from implementation of interventions.

Across the cases explored, only a handful explained the theory of change behind their program or policy intervention. Clarity of intention is critical to evaluation to help advance our understanding of an intervention's impact and support continuous learning and program improvements. Government and program funders can play an essential role by requiring and funding program and policy evaluation and knowledge mobilization activities that consider both immediate and long-term effects of specific interventions that foster more inclusive communities.

Monitoring and enforcement of interventions is critical to effective implementation.

Without monitoring and enforcement, implementation deteriorates, and the interventions lose their power to generate impact. Having policies that protect residents is important, but compliance must be monitored and enforced. An effective tactic is for governments to tie funding or permitting decisions to compliance.

Strengthening the Ecosystem

This report has taken important steps in gathering and analyzing interventions shown to mitigate the negative effects of neighbourhood change. While an important contribution, we recognize there are gaps in the primary research available on these and other interventions. Specifically, limitations on defined outcomes, success metrics and isolation of variables of neighbourhood change have limited this work. Further research will deepen our understanding of what works best in supporting inclusive communities. We propose several areas of inquiry worth further consideration:

i. Establishing an evaluation framework for inclusive change would provide guidance and needed rigour to the complexity of neighbourhood change. In our research, program and policy evaluation was often a missing component, limiting our ability to adequately identify successful practices. By creating an inclusive communities evaluation framework, a broader set of interventions than detailed here could be fruitfully explored for application. The framework would also minimize the cost of ongoing evaluation of any interventions' impact in neighbourhoods by establishing a comprehensive set of shared measures and indicators that could be used to evaluate inclusive neighbourhood change.

ii. The examples in this report illustrate that communities have a leg up when they can prepare for neighbourhood change. For example, opportunities for creating communal investing models are more feasible when land is cheaper. Having the capacity to identify neighbourhoods at risk of change could better prepare communities for how best to organize and plan for what they need. Developing a map like Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies or the Urban Displacement Project's Estimated Displacement Risk model for the GTA would be beneficial to communities.

iii. The success metrics used to assess the interventions featured in this report rely mostly on proxy indicators—number of residents supported, number of affordable units built or replaced, rate of rent increases over time. Additional research identifying the number of households that move out of a neighbourhood as a direct result of redevelopment and the number of new lower-income residents able to settle in a redeveloped neighbourhood, disaggregated by social identity characteristics, could add important empirical insights into which interventions and combinations of interventions work best, for whom, and under which enabling conditions.

Conclusion

Neighbourhood change is complex: many factors influence the development of community change projects and the success of initiatives to support equitable and inclusive change in communities. A better understanding of the intended and unintended consequences of neighbourhood revitalization and change projects, and the breadth of their variation, can help community and local governments make more informed decisions about where to focus their time, efforts, resources and investments. Neighbourhoods across the GTA are changing and we risk creating greater geographic and socio-economic disparities among residents if we do not prioritize equity as an explicit ambition of neighbourhood change processes. This report serves as a partial roadmap to enhance more equitable and inclusive impacts of neighbourhood change across the GTA.

The nine program and policy interventions detailed in this report are not exhaustive. Far from it. Communities and partnerships continue to build on legacies of developing and applying innovative solutions. This research reinforces that, and the benefits of evidence gathering and evaluation.

Some of the interventions explored here, such as **linkage fees** and **inclusionary zoning**, assume that leveraging funds from the private sector is a good way to build strong communities since development is happening anyway. This report also highlights successful, innovative communal models, like **community land trusts**, that may need government involvement to help them succeed. The former approach sees land as a commodity, the latter as a communal good. In practice, both are true. The market economy should

not cause or exacerbate harms historically and presently felt by low-income members of our communities, many of whom are racialized peoples, people living with disabilities, people who identify as 2SLGBTQ+ and women. Private development is useful in getting housing built and it should be appropriately leveraged to benefit the community. There are also opportunities for governments and the philanthropic sector to redirect their assets to communal ownership models instead of selling them to private entities to raise revenue.

The interventions presented here are useful at protecting low-income residents disproportionately impacted by neighbourhood change processes, particularly individuals and communities who have been systemically disadvantaged through discriminatory practices and policy decisions. Ultimately, these interventions can work complementarily with other social and public policies such as living or fair wage policies, social assistance reform and greater access to education to reduce income inequality and enable all residents the same opportunities to thrive within their communities.

Building on work developed over years, United Way Greater Toronto is committed to a vision of a GTA where every neighbourhood is inclusive, strong and vibrant, and everyone has an opportunity to build a better life. Available evidence reinforces that a suite of interventions is required to address neighbourhood change, and that all sectors, including most critically community services, are needed to realize this vision. The nine interventions detailed here provide a starting point for local communities to advocate for and implement, in partnership with government and the corporate and philanthropic sectors, interventions that will support the kind of inclusive neighbourhood change that will benefit all residents of the region.

Appendix A

Research Objectives, Methodology and Limitations

This work set out to assemble and assess the evidence available on program and policy interventions that support development of more inclusive communities. The following questions guided the identification process:

- Which programmatic interventions support more equitable outcomes for structurally disadvantaged residents and leverage the positive impacts of neighbourhood change?
- Which policies support the development of more inclusive communities?

We reviewed existing research and discourse in academic and grey literature on interventions that are posited to be beneficial for inclusion and equity during times of neighbourhood change. Through this, we selected nine types of interventions to frame this report. We used specific examples to highlight different approaches to public policy and program design and implementation at the level of the neighbourhood and government. We recognize that other promising interventions exist and may be successful but, without the presence of evidence in the literature, have not included them here.

The nine interventions identified met our criteria for intent, impact and evidence:

Intent
- Improve outcomes for low-income residents and/or community serving organizations and small businesses in the neighbourhood
- Improve long-term impacts for groups experiencing vulnerabilities (i.e., not focused on short-term societal crisis like the early phases of COVID-19)

Impact
- Experienced at the municipal or neighbourhood level
- Relevant to the GTA

Evidence
- Implementation and evaluation have occurred
- Sufficient data/literature exists to extrapolate lessons learned

Appendix A

This report relies on examples from the United States over Canada. This is not to suggest Canada lacks innovative practices aimed at building inclusive communities, but rather that it lacks evaluation and documentation of those practices. Where possible we have included Canadian examples for context.

To further ground this report in United Way's geographical catchment—Peel, Toronto and York Region—we conducted a policy scan on each of the policy interventions included in this report. We identified relevant provincial Acts as well as plans, policies and bills previously and currently adopted across the region. This required close consideration of regional responses, as well as local municipal and lower-tier municipal levels in York Region and the Region of Peel.

Finally, where direct evidence of success is unavailable, the analysis relies on proxies to assess whether interventions were successful at promoting inclusive communities. When describing inclusive economies, given the complexity of economic empowerment and physical infrastructure, for some aspects of inclusive communities there is little direct evidence about "what works." Similarly, when pulling on evidence around housing interventions, we found that evidence often draws indirect links to impacts on inclusive communities. For example, in many housing-related interventions, anti-displacement measures were used as a proxy for the strength of physical infrastructure during neighbourhood change. In cases where the literature did not report on displacement, success was measured in terms of whether and how much affordable housing was produced or preserved.

Appendix B

Further Readings

The following texts may be useful to a reader seeking additional examples of the program and policy interventions identified in this report.

Workforce Agreements

All-In Cities. (n.d.-b). *Local and targeted hiring.*
https://allincities.org/toolkit/local-targeted-hiring

Neighbourhood-Level Workforce Development Programs

Harrison, B. & Weiss, M. S. (1998). *Workforce Development Networks: Community-based Organizations and Regional Alliances.* Sage Publications.

Community Land Trusts

Africatown Community Land Trust. (n.d.). *Honoring our past, building our future.*
https://www.africatownlandtrust.org/

Foldy, E., & Walters, J. (2004). *The power of balance: Lessons from Burlington Community Land Trust.* NYU Wagner.
https://wagner.nyu.edu/files/faculty/publications/20.pdf

Lauria, M., & Comstock, E. (2007). The effectiveness of community land trusts. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep18233

Rent Control

Gupta, D. K., & Rea, L. M. (1984). Second-generation rent control ordinances: A quantitative comparison. *Urban Affairs Quarterly, 19*(3), 395–408.
https://doi.org/10.1177/004208168401900308

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https://doi.org/10.1080/14616710802037466

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https://doi.org/10.1080/01944360008976096

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Inclusionary Zoning

All-In Cities. (n.d.-c). *Inclusionary zoning*. https://allincities.org/toolkit/inclusionary-zoning

Linkage Fees

Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning. (2021). *Regional housing initiative*. https://www.cmap.illinois.gov/programs/housing/rhi

Social Procurement

PolicyLink. (2017, March 30). Expanding opportunity in city contracts: St. Paul's racial equity strategy. https://www.policylink.org/equity-in-action/st-paul-contracting

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AECON. (2022). *Innovative Aecon-Golden Mile joint venture expanding economic opportunities and helping local residents launch careers in the trades.* https://www.aecon.com/press-room/news/2022/11/23/innovative-aecon-golden-mile-joint-venture-expanding-economic-opportunities-and-helping-local-residents-launch-careers-in-the-trades

All-In Cities. (n.d.-a). *Equitable contracting and procurement*. https://allincities.org/toolkit/contracting-and-procurement

Angotti, T., & Jagu, C. (2007). *Community land trusts and low-income multifamily rental housing: The case of Cooper Square, New York City*. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. https://www.lincolninst.edu/publications/working-papers/community-land-trusts-low-income-multifamily-rental-housing

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